When firms engaged in R&D are observably heterogenous (in size) and policymakers are able to condition policy on the observed heterogeneity, what is the optimal policy? This paper starts with a static two-stage duopoly model of R&D competition with uncertainty and finds it welfare enhancing to subsidize the larger firms, with no subsidies for (or taxes on) the smaller firm (extending existing results, Lahiri and Ono, 1999) . This result follows because marginal cost reductions by the largest firm have larger net effects on consumer and producer surplus.
Introduction
What is the optimal allocation of R&D subsidies across firms that are observably heterogeneous in size? The empirical Industrial Organization literature provides substantial evidence that the social rates of return to R&D greatly exceed private rates of return (see Griliches, 1998) . The endogenous growth literature emphasizes the importance of the R&D process in driving growth and largely concurs that R&D subsidies from the government can be welfare enhancing. Restrictive assumptions regarding market structure and firm homogeneity allow these models to be tractable (e.g. Aghion & Howitt, 1993 , Peretto, 1999 , but questions about the optimal allocation of R&D subsidies across heterogenous firms cannot be addressed in these frameworks.
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Prior answers to the question posed above can be found in the industrial organization literature. However, these investigations have been limited to static analyses. In a static, symmetric duopoly model with linear demand, Hinloopen (1997 Hinloopen ( , 2000 finds the optimal R&D subsidy is zero if there are no R&D spillovers, and positive subsidies if there are. Lahiri and Ono (1988) consider asymmetric firms. They show that exogenously reducing the cost of production for the relatively small firm harms welfare when the initial cost differential between firms is sufficiently large. Lahiri and Ono (1999) extend the result to consider cost-reducing R&D investments and find that the initially more efficient firm should be subsidized and the less efficient firm be taxed. In the static setting subsidizing the larger firm is welfare enhancing because the reductions in the marginal cost of the largest firm have larger net effects on consumer and producer surplus. Lahiri and Ono (1999) further find the optimal R&D subsidy to be dependent on the shape of the demand curve. When firms are symmetric and demand is convex the optimal policy is subsidy both firms, but negative (R&D tax) if demand is concave. If the firms are asymmetric in size, it is optimal to always favor the larger firm.
2
In this paper, we also begin with a static duopoly model in which R&D is a stochastic process and the firms compete in Cournot fashion. We extend the framework of Lahiri and Ono (1999) who consider deterministic R&D, by introducing stochastic R&D and show that the results carry through. In addition, if R&D subsidies cannot be conditioned on firm size, we find that it is welfare enhancing for the policymaker to tax both firms to reduce wasteful duplication. The results also hold when the demand curve is concave or convex.
What is not clear is whether these results extend to a dynamic framework. The closest paper to our work is Akcigit and Acemoglu (2011) who consider a dynamic Bertrand setting emphasizing intellectual property rights in a winner-take-all scenario. They find that the optimal policy is "state-dependent" in which the degree of patent protection increases with the technology gap between the lead firm and follower firms, a result that mirrors the static Cournot duopoly conclusions.
In our dynamic model, based on Ericson and Pakes (1995) , we consider Cournot competition, as in the static literature. The policymaker can condition the subsidies (taxes) on relative firm size. In this case, the policymaker considers the impact of subsidies, not only on the implications for static welfare, but also on the resulting long-run degree of market concentration which affects welfare over time. Our results demonstrate that the static results are not robust to a dynamic setting. The optimal policy depends on the equilibrium type of competition that emerges without intervention, an insight that cannot be found in a static setting. When the environment is characterized by very little R&D by both firms, providing subsidies to the larger of the two firms and taxing the smaller firm raises welfare by providing an incentive to lower costs even though the result is greater product market concentration. However, if the initial environment (without intervention) is dominated by one firm, the optimal policy reverses. In this case, the policymaker increases welfare through subsidizing the small firm and taxing the larger firm. Finally, if the environment is characterized by intense R&D competition, the optimal policy is to tax both firms because much of the firms' private gains derive from business stealing rather than increases in social welfare.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 begins by laying out the static duopoly environment and Section 3 discusses these results. Section 4 sets up the infinite horizon model. Section 5 illustrates the core results from the dynamic model and analyzes a series of robustness exercises. Section 6 concludes.
Static Duopoly Model
We begin with a static duopoly model found elsewhere in the literature for two reasons. First, it is useful to understand the driving force behind the optimal policy in this setting because the same effects are present in the dynamic setting developed in Section 4. Second, our model is a close but not identical match to the prior literature. We introduce several alterations which will be necessary in moving to the dynamic framework. We verify that our model extends the previous results and ensures they are robust to the alterations introduced. Thus, the changes in optimal policy found in Section 5 derive entirely from the dynamic environment and not from minor changes made to period game.
Consider two firms, i ∈ [1, 2], producing a homogenous product. The firms differ only in their initial stock of innovations, w i , and compete in two stages. In the first stage, firms choose R&D efforts, x i , in order to increase the probability of successful innovation and increase their stock of innovations. With homogenous products we focus on process innovations, thus the stock of innovations maps directly into marginal costs. A greater stock of innovations means lower marginal costs of production. In the second stage, firms compete in the product market in Cournot fashion, choosing production quantities denoted by q i .
A welfare maximizing policymaker observes the initial stock of innovations and gives firm-specific ad valorem R&D subsidies (or taxes), s i , financed through a lump-sum tax on consumers. The policymaker grants R&D subsidies (or taxes) to maximize the total welfare (consumer surplus plus producer surplus net of taxes). 
Product Market Competition
We begin with the second stage and derive the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. Firm i's second stage decision is to maximize profits with respect to quantity given the demand and R&D outcome. Profits for firm i (the rival faces a symmetric optimization problem) are
where P (Q) is the general inverse demand, Q = q i +q j , and mc i is the constant marginal cost of production. Each firm chooses q i to maximize profits competing noncooperatively and taking first period R&D decisions as given. The first order condition for firm i is
3 At this point, we are not considering subsidies or taxes on output. Distortionary policy on output creates a significantly more complicated game. If the policymaker cannot observe costs (or innovations) firms have a rent-seeking incentives to manipulate the level of output when the subsidies are conditioned on output.
Assuming an interior solution yields the well-known optimal solutions and equilibrium price as functions of the demand parameters and the marginal costs of the two firms:
where we assume downward sloping demand curve for all Q: P (Q) < 0.
R&D Competition
R&D is conducted to increase the probability of successfully innovating which reduces the marginal cost of production. Each firm begins with an initial stock of innovations, w i . The marginal cost of production for firm i is expressed as
where ν is an indicator taking on an integer value, ν ≥ 1, if R&D is successful and 0 otherwise. ∆ is the outcome of a negative shock which takes the value of one if the shock occurs and zero otherwise. The negative shock occurs with the exogenous probability of δ and is required to bound the state space in the dynamic setting which is the subject of section 4. In the remainder of this section, we suppress the negative shock, ∆, to simplify the exposition, i.e. we set δ = 0, but use a non-zero value in the numerical simulations. mc 0 is the marginal cost of production with zero innovations and η is a parameter that governs the rate at which each innovation reduces the marginal cost. We assume R&D outlays increase the probability of innovation at a diminishing rate. There are no R&D spillovers and R&D productivity is constant and symmetric across firms, as in Pakes and McGuire (1994) . We utilize the following functional form:
wherew > 0 is the constant, symmetric R&D productivity parameter. In the first stage, each firm chooses their level of R&D to maximize their expected value, V 1 and V 2 , given the R&D subsidies. The maximization problem for firm i is:
where c is the constant and symmetric marginal cost of R&D and x i and x j are the R&D outlays for firm i and firm j respectively. π i,xx are the reduced form profits from stage two for firm i given the R&D outcome. There are four possible outcomes from the R&D competition between firms: 1) Both firms successfully innovate; 2) firm 1 is successful while firm 2 is unsuccessful; 3) firm 2 is successful while firm 1 is unsuccessful; or 4) neither firm successfully innovates. Thus, the first letter, x, in the subscripts on π refer to the R&D outcome of firm i and the second letter refers to the R&D outcome for the rival firm. For example, π i,F S is the stage two profits for firm i if firm i fails (F ) and firm j succeeds (S) in innovation.
Assuming interior solutions, the first order condition is:
where
The noncooperative equilibrium outlays of R&D are determined by solving the two firms' reaction functions taking s 1 and s 2 as given. Rearranging (7) yields:
Note the second term in the equation (8) is a constant and creates regions of corner solutions for the optimal choice of x i , coasting states in the terminology of Ericson and Pakes (1995) . These will apply whenever the expected marginal gain from innovating is small. A small marginal gain will typically apply when one firm has high marginal costs relative to the other firm, but may apply to one or both firms. An inefficient firm may find that successful R&D produces little gain on its competitor and shuts down R&D conceding the lion's share of the market to its larger, more efficient rival. In addition, the more efficient firm may be a monopoly or near monopoly and thus find little gain from innovating and optimally choose to cease its R&D operations. The slope of the reaction function is given by:
(9) Notice that subsidies increase R&D and increase the slope in (9) holding the rival's probability of success constant. The shape of the R&D reaction functions depend on the difference between the marginal gain in profits from successful innovation conditional on the R&D outcome of the rival firm. Using (8) , the reaction function is downward sloping if the following condition holds:
If (10) holds, the marginal gain in profit from successful innovation is larger if the rival firm fails in their R&D efforts. In other words, R&D is a strategic substitute. If condition 1 does not hold, then R&D is a strategic complement. In this case in order to guarantee existence of an equilibrium, the slope of the reaction function must be strictly less than 1.
Policymaker
The policymaker maximizes welfare (the sum of consumer and producer surplus minus taxes) by choosing subsidies for each firm which are paid for in the form of a lump sum tax on consumers given by:
The policymaker chooses the level of subsidies (or taxes) and can distinguish between the large and the small firm. In other words, the policymaker can observe the efficiency levels of the two firms without error. There are two distortions the policymaker faces, one in the product market and one in the R&D competition. In the product market there is oligopolistic pricing. In R&D, there is a business stealing effect, a negative externality, since each firm privately gains from increasing market share, but at the expense of the rival.
Static Results
We first consider the symmetric case. Since the firm's identities are irrelevant, without loss of generality, we assume firm 1 holds a higher stock of initial innovations, i.e. w 1 ≥ w 2 . Thus, firm 1 begins with a lower marginal cost and a larger initial market share. We solve for the optimal firm specific subsidies and we also consider the case in which subsidies (or taxes) are forced to be symmetric across firms. Since many of the results can be found more formally expressed in Lahiri and Ono (1999) and Kitahara and Matsumura (2006) , in what follows we use a numerical approach to illustrate the welfare maximizing policies. Table 1 lists the parameters used in the approach taken here. 
Static Results with Linear Demand
We begin with the case of linear demand in which the inverse demand curve is given by P = A − B (Q) α where A, B > 0, α = 1 and Q ≤ A/B. For the purposes of the simulation the demand intercept is given by A = 30 and the demand slope is given by B = 1. The well known results are summarized below:
Result 1: When firms are symmetric and face a linear demand curve the welfare maximizing subsidies are s 1 = s 2 = 0. 87.420 Lump Sum Tax  0   Table 2 summarizes the maximum welfare result. In Table 2 , we set each firm's efficiency level to 10. The firms optimally choose R&D such that they have a 39.9% chance of success. Their expected profits are 87.42 each and overall welfare is 350.78. The policymaker optimally chooses no subsidies as in Hinloopen (1997) .
Result 2:
If subsidies are forced to be symmetric across firms, the larger the gap between firm sizes, the more each firm is taxed, s 1 = s 2 < 0. Table 3 summarizes the results for two combinations of firm sizes. The first combination consists of the more efficient firm having a stock of knowledge of w 1 = 10, while the less efficient firm having a stock of knowledge of w 2 = 2. The second combination consists of the more efficient firm having a stock of knowledge of w 1 = 10, while the less efficient firm having a stock of knowledge of w 2 = 6.
The intuition is that the smaller firm's R&D efforts result in business stealing, a transfer of surplus between firms rather than social gains. The policymaker then optimally chooses to tax both firms to discourage the wasteful R&D by the smaller firm. By discouraging the small firm, the expected gains for the larger firm increase since it will be subject to a lower probability of business stealing. The larger firm increases R&D despite the tax. Innovations by the larger firm lead to a lower average cost of production. Moreover, the policymaker does not have the power of a social planner who would produce all output at the firm with the lower marginal cost. Thus, the policymaker, through the tax policy, works to shift production to the more efficient firm. Result 3: When firm 1 has a marginal cost advantage, the welfare maximizing subsidies are s 1 > 0 and s 2 < 0. The larger the gap between between firm sizes, the more the small firm is taxed and the larger firm is subsidized. Table 4 summarizes the results for two combinations of firm sizes. The first combination consists of the more efficient firm having a stock of knowledge of w 1 = 10, while the less efficient firm having a stock of knowledge of w 2 = 2. In the second combination w 1 = 10 and w 2 = 6. Notice that the subsidy and the tax both increase in the absolute value of the difference in efficiency levels, w 1 − w 2 . Figure  1 summarizes the optimal R&D subsidies and taxes when the firms differ with respect to size and the policymaker is able to condition the subsidies on their size. Figure 1 shows the optimal subsidy (positive value) or tax (negative value) for a given stock of knowledge at firm 2. 
Static Results with Nonlinear Demand
The inverse demand curve remains P = A − B (Q) α but now α = 1. When α > 1 the inverse demand curve is concave and with α < 1 it is convex. Prices, quantities and profits are summarized below:
Consumer surplus is given by
The shape of the demand curve alters the optimal subsidies to R&D. In the symmetric firm case with a concave (convex) inverse demand curve, the optimal policy is to tax (subsidize) the R&D efforts of both firms. In the linear case, the optimal policy was no taxes or subsidies. Table 5 provides an example. Under asymmetric firms, the optimal policy is to provide more support for the large firm. If demand is concave and the firms are close in size, the policymaker taxes the small firm more than the larger firm. If the inverse demand curve is convex, the optimal subsidy is smaller for the small firm relative to the larger firm. This is shown in Tables 6 and 7 
Dynamic Model
The two-period model of Section 3 yields results consistent with previous work, although we do consider uncertainty regarding the outcome of the R&D process. The questions of relevance to the current paper concern the robustness and validity of the optimal R&D policy in a dynamic setting. Moving to a dynamic setting allows for several key features unavailable in the static context. First, and foremost, the analysis above by necessity needs to take the initial state, i.e. the starting values of w 1 and w 2 as given. By embedding the two-stage static game in a dynamic context, the equilibrium ergodic distribution of the states becomes endogenous. Thus, the policy choices will influence the distribution itself and, in turn, feedback into the optimal policy. 5 Second, and crucial, the dynamic setting with forward looking firms means that firms will anticipate changes in the relative efficiency levels and their impact on firm values when making R&D policy decisions. When we analyze subsidies conditional on relative firm size, firms will account for possible gain/loss of subsidies or a switch to taxes in choosing R&D levels. For example, suppose only the large firm is given a subsidy for R&D. In the static setting, since the game ends with product market sales even if the smaller firm becomes the larger firm after the R&D uncertainty is resolved, the change in relative size has no bearing on the R&D decisions. In the dynamic setting that is no longer the case as firms will anticipate potential changes to subsidies altering their 5 Additionally, an analysis of the trade off between concentration and growth becomes feasible. Growth in a static model is conditional upon the initial state. Moreover, the growth rate can only be assessed as a one shot level of growth and no inferences on the sustainability of that level can be obtained. Since the dynamic version of the model endogenizes the ergodic distribution of states, the growth rate itself is endogenous to the system. Therefore, the welfare analysis can account for the social gains that occur through long-run cost reductions. However, in the current version of the model, we restrict the long-run growth rate to be zero. We do that for two reasons. First, without long-run growth we can more directly compare the welfare changes found here with the static model above. Second, in future work, we will allow for long-run growth in the manner described in Laincz (2009) . Upon doing so, we can account directly for the welfare gains that accrue to the changes in the growth rate above and beyond the static gains.
incentives to engage in R&D.
Finally, entry and exit can be incorporated in the dynamic set up. Although beyond the scope of the present paper, we suspect this feature may have a large effect on optimal policy. Without entry and exit, subsidies targeted to small firms may be inefficient since weak firms lack the incentive to exit. With exit as a choice, weak firms will leave the market and new firms will enter helping to maintain more intense competition. In addition, larger firms will possess incentives to drive competitors out of the market, a stronger form of Aghion et al.'s (2001) escape competition effect.
Dynamic Setting
In each period of time, firms choose the level of R&D expenditures that maximizes the expected present discounted value of their future stream of profits. The state of the industry is summarized by the vector of the efficiency levels of the firms, s = [w i , w j ]. Denote pr(s | s) as a firms' perceptions of the probability that the industry state it faces will be s , conditional on the current industry state. The optimal R&D choice solves the following Bellman equation subject to a non-negativity constraint on R&D:
where β = 1/(1 + r), with r standing for the interest rate, is the discount factor common to all firms (and consumers), and π i (s) denotes the profits to firm i in industry state s. c represents the unit cost of R&D. s i again represents the percentage subsidy (tax) applied to firm i. The first-order condition is:
where, in the dynamic context, C S represents the value of the firm conditional on successful innovation and C F is the value conditional on failure to innovate. Rearranging, the optimal R&D level, for an interior solution, can be expressed as:
Similar to the two-stage game, R&D is positively related to the gains in value from innovation, C S − C F , the level of the subsidy, s i , the discount factor, β, and negatively related to the cost of R&D, c.
As in the static environment, 1/w, is a constant and creates regions of corner solutions for the optimal choice of x i , coasting states. These will apply whenever the expected marginal gain from innovating, C S − C F , is small. A small marginal gain will typically apply when one firm has high marginal costs relative to the other firm, but may apply to one or both firms. An inefficient firm may find that successful R&D produces little gain on its competitor and shuts down R&D conceding the market to its larger, more efficient rival. In addition, the more efficient firm may be a monopoly or near monopoly and thus find little gain from innovating and optimally choose to cease its R&D operations.
The evolution of the stock of innovations needs to include the possibility of a negative shock to ensure the state space is bounded. In each period, there is a random negative shock, ∆, to the stock of innovations for both firms which occurs with probability δ. ∆ can also be interpreted as a negative shock to marginal costs to all firms.
6 Thus, the stock of innovations for firm i evolves according to:
where the new stock of innovations is the sum of the previous innovation level, a positive increment, ν i , if firm i successfully reduces costs through R&D, and the outcome of the negative shock, ∆, which takes the value one if the shock occurs and zero otherwise. The equilibrium here is Markov Perfect. The model satisfies the Unique Investment Choice criteria as describes in Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2009), so that an equilibrium exists. However, as is well known in this class of models, proving uniqueness remains elusive. The equilibrium is also a rational expectations equilibrium. The solution yields policy choices such that the probabilities of evolving from one state to another match the firms' perceptions of those probabilities.
Computation
To analyze the dynamic model, we do need to simulate. We retain the same parameters as before, but need to specify the discount rate, β, which we assign 1/1.04. In order to ensure that the equilibrium ergodic distribution lies within the state space, we initially set the maximum number of innovations to 100 for both firms. That level was more than adequate as firms stopped innovating, even under extremely large subsidies, well below the maximum level. However, we do need to alter the demand intercept, set at A = 30 in section 3. Here we reduce that value to A = 12. The reason is that the firms' now look at the long-run value which greatly exceeds the one-period profits. Thus, firms are willing to conduct R&D with a much smaller demand. In fact, in the numerical example in the static setting when A = 12 firms optimally choose x = 0. However, in the dynamic setting with a large demand firms conduct significantly more R&D resulting in a high frequency of exceeding the state space, even as large as it is. The reduction from 30 to 12 approximately sets the static firm profits in industry state s = [0, 0] equal to firm values in the dynamic model at the same state.
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The solution method first computes the static profits for all possible states. Value function iteration then yields the equilibrium values and policy functions. To compute the ergodic distributions under each R&D policy scenario we apply two methods. In most cases we simulate the model by using the optimal values and policy functions for 10 million periods, discarding the first 10,000 to eliminate any initial state bias and resetting the starting industry state to the mode from the first 10,000 periods. Simulations for each parameterization typically take a few minutes to run in C code. Alternatively, we use the transition matrix, denoted T , constructed from the optimal policy functions. Construction of the transition matrix is fairly straightforward. The equilibrium asymptotic ergodic distribution, T e can then be found as follows:
We set a strong level of error tolerance for the iterations such that the probability of a state occurring was within 0.000001 margin of approximation error. This procedure takes considerably more time for a single equilibrium covering a space of over 5000 states. However, for those cases where we did compute the asymptotic ergodic distribution directly in this manner, comparison with the simulation method, showed that the simulations were quite accurate and significantly faster. Thus, below we report results from the simulation method. To find the optimal policy we consider a range of subsidies (taxes) for each firm from +90% (subsidy) to -100% (tax) in steps of 10 percentage points which yields 400 possible combinations of subsidies and taxes. As in the previous section, the subsidies 7 Moreover, with such large demand, if we allowed entry and entry costs were not prohibitively high, there would be a great deal more than 2 firms. Thus, we lowered the demand intercept to get closer to a specification where entry is less likely. 8 In the future, we may be able to optimize the asymptotic procedure or use a less stringent criteria to accelerate the process. One question of interest, to us anyway, is how accurate the simulation procedure actually is. Visual inspection of the ergodic distributions show little difference, but we can compute directly the level of the errors which would produce information on the tolerance level for error in the direct computation where actual accuracy gains begin to occur.
are conditional on relative firm size. 9 In each case we evaluate welfare and the optimal policy is chosen based on the maximum value. Welfare in the dynamic context differs from the static model in several ways. First, since the firms are infinitely lived, we use values instead of one-period profits for producer surplus. Second, consumer welfare is the expected long-run value rather than the one period difference between the demand curve and the price. Thus, we use the probabilities for each possible price from the ergodic distribution to compute the weighted expected consumer surplus and find the long-run value, using the same discount factor, β, for consumers as applies to firms. Taxes and subsidies are computed in the same manner and are subtracted (added) to consumer surplus in each state prior to calculating the long-run expected value.
Dynamic Model Results

Equilibrium Ergodic Distributions of States
Before looking at how taxes and subsidies affect welfare, it is essential to understand the ergodic distribution of industry states that emerge without any government intervention. Given a set of parameters, there are essentially four types of distributions that arise which we label: 1) symmetric innovation; 2) bi-modal innovation; 3) asymmetric innovation; and 4) low innovation. In general, welfare declines respectively with the types. In the symmetric innovation distribution, the R&D and product markets are intensely competitive with both firms heavily engaged in innovation and the product market characterized by a low C1 index of concentration. Figure 3 displays the equilibrium ergodic distribution where the efficiency level of the larger firm is on the x-axis and the efficiency level of the smaller firm is on the y-axis. The z-axis shows the probability of each industry state. Under symmetric innovation, both firms are efficient as indicated by the large peak in the center of the graph. Simulations typically generate a C1 index ranging between 0.52 and 0.56, depending on the parameters, indicating that on average the larger firm holds between 2 and 6 percentage points more than half the market. Moreover, the identity of the larger firm (firm 1 or firm 2) changes frequently. As parameters weaken the market (e.g. lower demand or lower R&D productivity), the equilibrium shifts to the mixed innovation distribution as shown in Figure 4 which reveals a bimodal ergodic distribution. The symmetric innovation region remains but with lower probability. The new mode to the left is characterized by a near monopoly with the larger firm dominating the market and, typically, conducting significantly more R&D than the smaller firm. In essence the larger firm conducts the R&D to maintain its large cost advantage over the small firm which is discouraged, but not entirely absent, from participating in R&D.
As market conditions worsen, Figure 5 shows the asymmetric innovation distribution where the central mode disappears and the near monopoly mode that arose in Figure 4 now dominates. Keep in mind, we are ignoring entry and exit. Should exit be permitted, the smaller firm would likely leave the market altogether.
10 Finally, Figure 6 shows the low innovation distribution. Here the product market is nearly always monopolized by the larger firm, although the identity of the larger firm does change over time. Over time the two firms are splitting the market about evenly, but rarely do both firms produce simultaneously. However, the efficiency levels for both firms are always close to zero indicating that little innovation occurs. If the market conditions worsen further, the distribution collapses to an industry with no R&D, i.e industry state s = [0, 0] becomes an absorbing state.
The optimal policy depends on which of the four ergodic distribution types emerge without government intervention. To preview the results before turning to the simulation, broadly speaking the optimal policy is the one that achieves reaching the highest degree of innovation at the lowest social cost in terms of the taxes levied on consumers and investment costs borne by the firms. However, should the initial equilibrium be characterized by symmetric innovation, the optimal policy is typically a tax on both firms as the marginal welfare gains from additional innovation are outweighed by the losses through business stealing effects. In contrast, in the three other distribution types, the optimal policy involves subsidies to at least one firm and, in some cases, both.
Dynamic Linear Demand Results
To analyze the optimal policies, we seek to modify a single parameter which generates the different equilibria described above while holding the other parameters fixed. After some analysis of the effects of the various parameters, we selectedw which governs the productivity of R&D. At low values, firms find it too costly to engage in R&D. As w increases, the equilibrium proceeds through the types described above from low to asymmetric to bi-modal to symmetric. We varied thew across a range from 0.15 to 0.4. To get a sense of how much of difference this makes, consider the difference in R&D expenditures required to attain a probability of 0.5 of success, a probability equal to that of the negative shock, δ, and therefore the level required for the firm to remain at the same efficiency level in expectation. Rearranging, equation (8) and using P r = 0.5:
Thus, at the high end,w = 0.4 it requires 2.5 units of R&D expenditure to achieve a 50% probability of success. At the low end,w = 0.15, the requirement more than doubles to 6.67 units of R&D expenditure. The four values forw that generate distribution types as described above are 0.175, 0.25, 0.3, and 0.4, and the corresponding C1 indices are: 1.0, 0.85, 0.62, and 0.51. 11 The range moves from monopoly (but with almost no R&D), to a dominant firm, to the bimodal and then to symmetric. Under the four different initial distributions the optimal policies differ. In the first case, whenw = 0.175 we have the low innovation environment. The small firm does no R&D and the large firm just a little bit on average. The optimal policy here is to subsidize the large firm at 10% which raises welfare substantially even though it solidifies the monopoly position of the large firm. Welfare is calculated by weighting the firm values and after tax consumer surplus by the probability of each industry state in equilibrium. Consumer surplus is then found for the infinite horizon using the discount factor, β. The sum of the firm values and consumer surplus is welfare. The optimal policy is the combination of taxes and subsidies that produces the highest level of welfare. Figure 7 shows the change in ergodic distribution under the optimal policy: the lefthand panel shows the ergodic distribution of industry states with no policy intervention; the right-hand side panel shows the distribution with the welfare maximizing R&D subsidy in place. The lower marginal costs for the large firm expand welfare substantially, increasing by 75%. Subsidies to the small firm would increase the incentive to conduct R&D, but decrease the appeal of becoming the large firm since the subsidies are then lost. Moreover, the small firm requires substantial subsidies to even begin conducting R&D at all, around 40%. As subsidies to the small firm increase, the large firm responds with lower R&D effort. The result is lower welfare with subsidies to the smaller firm in this environment.
When the initial environment is asymmetric (Figure 8 ), the policymaker can shift the ergodic distribution to the bi-modal distribution by subsidizing the small firm. The welfare gains are much more modest at 6%. The product market becomes significantly more competitive as the C1 index falls from 0.85 to 0.6. Further reductions in the C1 index are possible with higher subsidies but result in lower welfare due to the larger tax requirement and the reduced incentive for a firm to become the large firm as it loses the subsidies.
Starting from the bi-modal innovation distribution (Figure 9 ), the symmetric environment becomes attainable and generates a welfare improvement. Again, the smaller firm is subsidized, but now the larger firm is taxed. The welfare gain is comparable to the previous scenario, at about 6% and the C1 index falls from 0.69 to 0.52, a nearly symmetric duopoly on average.
However, when the distribution is initially symmetric (Figure 10 ), taxes become the optimal policy. For our particular parameterized case, the best policy is a 20% tax on both firms. Because of the intense competition, the marginal gains from further innovation are small and thus the R&D expenditures become socially wasteful. Notice that the R&D outlays are hardly changed even with the taxes applied. Table 8 summarizes the results by initial distribution.
The results, although specific to this example, indicate that the static policy recommendations are not robust to a dynamic environment. First, even though there are no spillovers, a zero subsidy policy is not optimal. Second, the optimal policy depends on the equilibrium distribution that emerges without intervention. That insight cannot be found in static models. Note also that we find cases where favoring the relatively small firm is optimal. That result stands in direct contrast to the static model results and differs in character from those of Acemoglu and Akcigit (2011). Table 9 presents a similar analysis for the cases where the demand curve is non-linear. The values ofw were adjusted such that the initial distributions match the four types. In Table 9 , where α = 1.15 yielding a concave inverse demand function, we see results that mimic those in the linear case. When the initial ergodic distribution is of the low type, a small subsidy to the large firm produces a large welfare gain of about 65% in moving the industry to asymmetric. With an increase in the R&D productivity parameter from 0.2 to 0.3 the environment is asymmetric without subsidies. The optimal policy is moderate subsidies to both the large and the small firm which induces a greater degree of competition by significantly increasing the R&D conducted by the smaller firm. Moreover, in the bi-modal setting whenw = 0.35, the optimal policy is a tax on the large firm and a subsidy to the small firm. However, in the symmetric distribution, the optimal policy is taxes on both firms.
Dynamic Non-Linear Demand Results
The static policy prescription for concave demand (See Figure 2) is to tax both firms when they are symmetric, but to favor the larger firm when they are asymmetric. If the relative size difference is sufficiently big, the larger firm receives a subsidy while the smaller firm receives a tax. The dynamic setting does not concur with those results. In the simulation above, the subsidies change depending on the initial competitive environment in a manner similar to that with linear demand. For a convex inverse demand curve (Table 9 : α = 0.75), the results are quite similar to those of both the linear and concave cases. Small subsidies to the larger firm are optimal when the environment is low innovation, larger subsidies to both firms in the asymmetric and bi-modal cases, and taxes on both in the symmetric case.
Robustness of Results
The results presented above are indicative of how the optimal policy changes in a dynamic setting. They show that the policy prescriptions of the static models do not generalize to the dynamic environment. However, moving from the example to a more robust policy prescription remains elusive which is not a surprise in a model with a large number of parameters and the lack of an analytical solution. While the results above show a general pattern for the policy based on the initial characteristics of the competitive environment, the complexity of the model still leaves the results short of definitive.
Here we vary the parameters in a systematic manner. We solve the model, construct the ergodic distribution, and find the optimal policy for all combinations of the parameter values shown in Table 10 .
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We also conduct the same variation for the following values for α which affects the curvature of the demand curve: 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1, 1.1, 1.5, and 2. That yields linear demand (α = 1) and three variations each for convex (α < 1) and concave (α > 1) inverse demand curves. The optimal policy search is the same as in the preceding section. We vary the subsidy (tax) on both firms from +90% to −100% allowing them to be specific to the firm conditional on relative size. Thus, each parameterization requires solving the value function 400 times, generating the ergodic distribution, and solving for the maximum welfare in each case. In total, we have about 21,000 parameterizations.
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The results here have not been easy to interpret. There is a fair amount of variation. However, some patterns do emerge related to the demand parameters, innovation parameters, and the initial ergodic distribution type. In general, but not without exception, the results can be characterized by considering dichotomous breakdowns in terms of market demand and R&D. By which we mean, we can look at high demand cases (high values of A and low values of B) versus low demand cases (low A and high B). In addition, we can separate a pattern by strong R&D environments (high η, highw, and low δ) versus weak R&D environments (low η, loww, and high δ). Tables 11, 12 , and 13 present a series of 2x2 tables corresponding to the low, asymmetric, and symmetric initial environments. The bi-modal environment is omitted for two reasons. First, it appears the least frequently, in less than 10% of all our parameter combinations. That indicates it is also the least stable as small parameter changes will tip the ergodic distribution towards either the asymmetric or symmetric modes. Second, and related to the first, the policy results are less clear and tend to reflect whether the bi-modal case is closer to the either of the uni-modal distribution types. That said, however, one pattern that is emerging for the symmetric and asymmetric cases is that frequently under the optimal policy, both modes appear with the asymmetric mode being significantly smaller. That suggests the optimal policy attempts to create an environment where the threat of exit from the product market serves an important role in establishing the welfare maximizing R&D incentives.
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The tables show the optimal policies that emerge most frequently starting with the low innovation environment. Along the left-hand side we separate demand into weak and strong and the columns similarly separate the R&D into weak and strong paramaterizations. Within each of the four boxes, "+" indicates a postive subsidy is optimal, "-" indicates a tax is optimal, and "0" indicates no subsidy or tax is optimal. These markers are ordered in terms of the policy towards the relatively large and relatively small firm, respectively. Beneath these indicators, we show the ergodic distribution type that most frequently emerges under the optimal policy.
For the low innnovation ergodic distribution as the initial environment, shown in Table 11 , when the demand is weak, the policy invariably calls for subsidizing the large firm and providing no subsidies to the small firm. However, if demand is strong, the optimal policy tends towards subsidies to both with a larger subsidy to the relatively larger firm. In none of our parameterizations did the low innovation ergodic distribution emerge with both high demand and strong R&D characteristics. Table 12 shows the policy choices when the initial environment is of the asymmetric type. Notice that similar to the previous case, the smaller firm receives subsidies when the demand parameters are strong, but no benefits when demand is low. The policy towards the large firm, however, depends on the R&D characteristics. When R&D is strong enough, the policymaker chooses to subsidize the firm's R&D to further drive down costs. However, if R&D is weak, the policymaker will frequently, but not always, choose a tax on the larger firm. In these cases, the large firm through a repeated series of R&D failures can lose its leading position to the rival, which then becomes the dominant firm. Thus, from a social welfare perspective the large firm is overspending on R&D in an effort to maintain a technological entry barrier.
Finally, in Table 13 we see a much more extensive use of taxes on R&D in the symmetric innovation environment. In most cases here, the larger firm is taxed. The small firm, however, in some cases is also taxed and in others is provided a subsidy. The difference appears, though it requires some further inspection on our part, as to whether the initial ergodic distribution is close to moving towards the asymmetric mode or not. If there exists a positive probability, although small, in equilibrium of reaching states corresponding to the asymmetric mode, the policymaker will choose a subsidy for the small firm. On the other hand, if the distribution is such that both firms remain in the symmetric region, the policymaker taxes them both to discourage wasteful R&D as the negative externality associated with business stealing dominates.
Conclusions
We find that the static model, as in previous research, suggests that optimal government policy should target subsidies toward the more efficient firm and tax the less efficient firm. Moving the same game to a purely dynamic setting shows the results change considerably in the dynamic context. Some patterns related to the parameters of the model begin to emerge. In general, the model suggests that in weak, low R&D environments, the policymaker should favor the large firm to encourage R&D. However, as the environment improves in terms of R&D and market demand, the policy shifts towards favoring the small firm to promote more intense competition in both R&D and in the product market. At the other end, when both demand and R&D are strong, the optimal policy is frequently to tax both firms.
There is reason to believe that certain adjustments to the model, available in the dynamic context but not in the static context, may further inform these results. The dynamic context allows for the endogenous determination of the degree of competition that arises under various subsidies. Second, allowing for entry and exit, and by extensions, a larger number of firms, may well yield different effects since those alterations will almost certainly affect the nature of the competition and degree of pricing distortion in the equilibrium ergodic distributions.
